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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHARLES R. MARTINEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900156-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended), whereby a defendant in 
a district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final order following conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree or capital felony. In this case, final judgment 
and commitment was rendered by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of relevant statutes and constitutinal provisions 
is set forth in Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in revoking 
Mr. Martinez' probation based on allegations 3 and 4 in the Affidavit 
in Support of Order to Show Cause? 
The appropriate standard of review is whether 
the trial judge abused his discretion; however, 
Appellant argues that for a trial judge to properly 
exercise his or her discretion in revoking 
probation, there must be at least a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
Did the officers illegally search and seize the evidence 
from the apartment? 
This is a question of law. 
Were Mr. Martinez' federal due process rights violated when 
the trial judge relied on conditions not set forth in the Affidavit 
in violating Mr. Martinez' probation? 
This is a question of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant, CHARLES R. MARTINEZ, was convicted of Possession 
of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony. The trial judge 
sentenced Mr. Martinez to serve zero to five years at the Utah State 
Prison but stayed imposition of such prison sentence and placed 
Mr. Martinez on probation. (R 31-2). Thereafter, on February 7, 
1990, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether 
Mr. Martinez had violated the terms of his probation. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked Mr. Martinez' 
probation and committed him to the Utah State Prison; the judge 
entered his written order to that effect on February 13, 1990. 
(R 50-1). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 2, 1990, Jeffrey T. Stickley, an officer with 
Adult Probation & Parole , went to an apartment located at 8070 West 
3500 South, number 23, where he believed Charles Martinez, the 
Appellant, resided. (T 5, 6, 30).* 
At approximately eight o'clock at night, Mr. Stickley and 
three other agents (T 29) arrived at the address and knocked on the 
door. (T 7). After the officers knocked loudly several times, a 
man answered the door. Officer Stickley introduced himself as 
Mr. Martinez' probation officer and stated that he would like to 
come in and see if Mr. Martinez was there. (T 7). The man who 
answered the door identified himself as Mike Martinez, Charles 
Martinez7 brother. (T 8). 
In addition to Mike Martinez, the officers encountered 
another male and female (who are not identified in the record) in 
the apartment. (T 8). 2 
1
 On the Probation Agreement which Mr. Martinez signed on 
December 18, 1989 (see Addendum A), Mr. Martinez listed his address 
as 8076 West 3500 South, #23, Magna, Utah. According to the field 
operations report, Officer Stickley testified that it was hard to 
tell whether the number written on the field operations report was 
8070 or 8076 (T 5), but that he had been to the apartment complex 
before and found that the only apartment 23 was located at 8070 West 
not 8076 West. (T 14). The field operations report apparently also 
indicated that Mr. Martinez resided with Debbie Hardmen, his 
fiancee. (T 6). 
2
 The officer testified that he did eventually learn the 
names of the other two people in the apartment, but he refused to 
disclose their identity because of a pending investigation of the 
two persons. (T 31). Therefore, the State never established 
whether the girlfriend who shared the house with Mr. Martinez was 
present during the search. 
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Probation Officer Stickley asked Mike Martinez if Stickley 
and the other officers could search the house for Charles Martinez. 
(T 8). According to Stickley, Michael Martinez responded, "We have 
nothing to hide in here. Go ahead." (T 8). 
During the search, officers found in the southeastern 
bedroom a receipt for a scale from the ChemShop. (T 16). Officer 
Stickley did not know exactly where in that bedroom the receipt was 
found. An officer also found a scale on the kitchen counter, 
thirty-seven small pipe screens on a kitchen cabinet, and ammunition 
on the kitchen table. (T 17, 21, 22). An officer found a glass 
vial containing white residue, a small hand-held scale in a box, and 
Charles Martinez' work card in the southwest bedroom. (T 21). 
Officers also found a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol 
tucked into the mattress of the bed in one of the bedrooms. 
(T 22). The State did not establish in which bedroom the gun was 
located. 
After a hearing, the trial judge revoked Mr. Martinez' 
probation, finding that he was in violation of probation based on 
Possession of a Firearm and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, as 
outlined in Points 3 and 4 of the Affidavit in Support of Order to 
Show Cause. See Addendum B for copy of Affidavit. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At the very least, the State must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has violated a 
condition of probation in order to revoke probation. 
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There is no evidence in this case linking the firearm found 
in the apartment to Mr. Martinez, Nor is there any evidence that 
possession of the firearm violated state or federal law, as required 
by condition number 5. 
There is not a sufficient nexus between any paraphernalia 
found in the apartment and Mr, Martinez; nor does the evidence 
establish an intent on the part of Mr. Martinez to use the 
paraphernalia in conjunction with illegal substances. 
The officers violated Mr. Martinez' fourth amendment rights 
when they searched the apartment. Assuming, arguendo. that 
Mr. Martinez could be linked to the apartment, the Probation 
Agreement did not allow officers to enter unless they had a 
reasonable suspicion. Mr. Martinez7 brother could not consent to 
entry and the officers failed to articulate facts amounting to a 
reasonable suspicion. 
Mr. Martinez' due process rights were violated when the 
trial judge violated his probation based on the violation of 
conditions not outlined in the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show 
Cause. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REVOKE 
MR. MARTINEZ' PROBATION. 
On January 3, 1990, the State filed an "Affidavit in 
Support of Order to Show Cause/1 alleging four violations of 
probation conditions by Mr. Martinez. (R 34-5). (See Addendum B.) 
- 5 -
Following a hearing held on February 7, 1990, the trial court 
dismissed the first two allegations based on insufficient evidence. 
(T 55). The court found, however, that there was sufficient 
evidence to establish the third and fourth allegations, (T 55). 
The third and fourth allegations are that Mr. Martinez: 
(3) had "in his possession a Firearm, on or about 
January 2, 1990, at about 8072 West 3500 South, 
number 23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, in violation of condition number 5 of the 
probation agreement" and 
(4) "committed the offense of possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, on or about 
January 2, 1990, at about 8072 West, 3500 South, 
number 23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah in violation of condition number 5 of the 
probation agreement." 
A. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED TO SUPPORT THE 
ALLEGATION THAT MR. MARTINEZ HAD A FIREARM IN HIS 
POSSESSION IN VIOLATION OF STATE OR FEDERAL LAW. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9) (1953 as amended), the statute 
applicable to probation violations, does not articulate the burden 
of proof to be applied by the trial judge in making findings that 
the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(9) provides in pertinent part: 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall 
admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. If 
the defendant denies the allegations of the 
affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present 
evidence on the allegations. The persons who have 
given adverse information on which the allegations 
are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for 
good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call 
witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and 
present evidence. 
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(e) After the hearing, the court shall make 
findings of fact. Upon a finding that the defendant 
violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
that the entire probation term commence anew. If 
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall 
be executed. 
Nor does Utah case law outline the applicable burden of proof. See 
State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981). In Cowdell, the 
Utah Supreme Court pointed out that "[t]he decision to modify or 
revoke probation is basically a discretionary matter" and that such 
modification or revocation must fit within due process precepts. 
Id. at 488. 
Whether the proper exercise of the trial judge's discretion 
in revoking probation requires that the State meet a specific burden 
of proof is not clear in Utah. However, a number of jurisdictions 
explicitly require the State to prove a probation violation by at 
least a "preponderance of the evidence." See, e.g., State v. 
Dawson, 282 S.E.2d 284, 288 (W. Va. 1981); Egerstaffer v. Israel, 
726 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1984).3 Because a criminal conviction and 
jail or prison sentence is involved, it is reasonable to require at 
a minimum that the State prove by a preponderance of evidence thajt 
the individual violated a condition of his probation. 
3
 A few jurisdictions use a standard under which the State 
must prove the violation to a "reasonable satisfaction." See 
Wink v. State. 563 A.2d 414 (Md. 1989); Dingstaff v. State, 480 S.2d 
50 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985). At least one jurisdiction requires the 
State to prove substantial evidence of the violation in order to 
revoke probation. See State ex rel. Thompson v. Riveland, 326 
N.W.2d 768 (Wise. 1982). 
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The violation must be willful and substantial and there 
must be "competent evidence of a violation" of a probation condition 
in order to revoke. See Williams v. Harris, 149 P.2d 640 (Utah 
1944) . Once a defendant has been placed on probation, he has a 
right to rely on the continuation of that probationary status unless 
"just cause" exists to revoke probation. Id. at 642; State v. 
Bonza, 150 P.2d 970f 972 (Utah 1944). See also Baine v. Beckstead, 
347 P.2d 554, 557 (Utah 1959), quoting State v. Zolantakis. 259 P. 
1044, 1047 ("[T]he right to personal liberty is one of the most 
sacred and valuable rights of a citizen and should not be regarded 
lightly."). Therefore, a defendant has the right to expect 
continued liberty so long as the conditions imposed upon him are 
complied with. Id. 
Regardless of the standard applied, the prosecution has the 
burden of proof and the trial judge cannot revoke probation 
arbitrarily or capriciously or otherwise abuse his or her discretion 
in revoking probation. See Bonza, 150 P.2d at 972. 
In the present case, the trial judge abused his discretion 
in finding that Mr. Martinez violated his probation by "having in 
his possession a Firearm, on or about January 2, 1990, at about 8072 
West 3500 South, number 23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, in violation of condition number 5 of the probation 
agreement" (emphasis added). 
Condition number 5 of the probation agreement provides: 
I shall obey all state and federal laws and 
municipal ordinances at all times. I shall report 
any arrests or citations to the Department of 
Corrections within seventy-two hours of occurrence. 
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See Addendum A. In order to possess a firearm in violation of the 
above condition, as claimed in allegation number 3, Mr. Martinez* 
possession of any firearm would have to constitute a crime under 
Utah or United States law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 outlines the 
persons not permitted to have firearms. It provides: 
(1)(a) Any person who is not either a 
citizen of the United States or a lawfully admitted 
alien whose business, occupation, or duties require 
the use of a dangerous weapon; or a lawfully 
admitted alien who has obtained a special hunting 
permit from the Department of Safety; or any person 
who has been convicted of any crime of violence 
under the laws of the United States, the State, or 
any other state, government, or country or who is 
addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or any 
person who has been declared mentally incompetent 
may not own or have in his possession or under his 
custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined 
in this part. The Department of Public Safety shall 
adopt rules governing the issuance and use of 
special hunting permits for lawfully admitted aliens. 
(d) Any person who violates this section is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and if the 
dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed off shotgun, 
he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2)(a) Any person who is on parole for a 
felony or is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison 
or other like facility may not have in his 
possession or under his custody or control any 
dangerous weapon as defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this section is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and if the 
dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive or infernal 
machine, he is guilty of a second degree felony.4 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 through 509 outlaw specific 
uses of firearms, including the carrying of a concealed dangerous 
weapon, the carrying of a loaded firearm in a vehicle, the use of a 
dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, the possession of a deadly 
weapon with intent to assault, the discharge of a firearm from a 
vehicle and the possession of a dangerous weapon by a minor. See 
Addendum C. There is no evidence in this case that Mr. Martinezi 
violated any of these statutes. 
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The State failed to produce any evidence that Mr. Martinez 
was not a citizen, that he had been convicted of a crime of 
violence, that he was addicted to a narcotic drug, that he was 
mentally incompetent, or that he was otherwise not entitled to 
possess a firearm under federal or state laws. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503(e) defines crimes of violence; possession of a 
controlled substance, the crime with which Mr. Martinez was 
convicted in the instant case, is not included in that list of 
crimes of violence. Nor was Mr. Martinez on parole or incarcerated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(2) clarifies that keeping an 
unloaded firearm in a residence is not a crime. It states: 
(2) Nothing in this part 5 shall prevent any 
person, except those persons described in 
§ 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of 
residence, place of business, or any vehicle under 
his control any firearm, except that it shall be a 
class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a 
vehicle. 
Hence, there is absolutely no evidence in the present case that 
possession of a firearm in a residence was a crime, in violation of 
condition number 5 of the probation agreement.5 
5
 Even if the State had intended that a showing of 
possession of a firearm would violate condition number 6 of the 
agreement, the facts and circumstances of the instant case do not 
establish that possession of an unloaded gun in the residence would 
violate condition number 6 of the probation agreement. Condition 
number 6 states: "I shall not own, possess, or have under my 
control or in my custody any explosives, firearms, or any dangerous 
weapons in violation of 18 USC § 921, et seq.; 18 USC App. § 1201, 
et seq. or Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 as amended" (emphasis added). 
(continued) 
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Even if this Court were to construe the probation agreement 
to preclude any possession of firearms, regardless of whether that 
possession violated a state or federal law, the evidence in the 
present case did not establish that Mr. Martinez possessed or had 
under his custody or control the firearm. Mr. Martinez was not 
present when officers searched the house (T 8, 10), and the Stat^ 
failed to link the firearm to Mr. Martinez. (T 22). The testimony 
established that the gun was in one of the bedrooms but failed to 
show which bedroom or whether it was a bedroom occupied by 
Mr. Martinez. Although Mr. Martinez apparently claimed that he 
lived in the apartment with his girlfriend when he signed the 
probation agreement on December 18, 1989, (T 6), the State did not 
establish that he in fact lived there at the time of the search. 
The probation officer had never seen Mr. Martinez there and, in 
fact, he encountered two other persons when the officers searched 
(footnote 5 continued) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 contains definitions. 
Possession of an unloaded firearm does not violate that statute as 
required by condition number 6. 18 USC § 1201, et seq. was repealed 
on May 19, 1986. 18 USC § 921 is also a definitional statute; there 
is no evidence that Mr. Martinez violated it. Perhaps the 
Department of Corrections intended condition number 6 to be an 
agreement not to possess any firearms as defined in the statutes 
listed. However, the condition does not say that. Because a 
criminal defendant is entitled to have the conditions of his 
probation clearly outlined (see Morrissey v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 47l, 
499 (1972)), the explicit language of condition number 6 cannot be 
changed to outlaw any possession of a firearm. In the present case, 
the judgment itself did not require the defendant not to possess 
firearms. The only enunciation of that condition appears to be in 
condition numbers 5 and 6 of the probation agreement, both of which 
outlaw the possession only if it violates state and federal laws^ 
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the apartment. The fact that the address listed by Mr. Martinez in 
the probation agreement was 8076 West 3500 South raises a further 
question as to whether Mr. Martinez lived in the apartment searched 
by the officers.6 
While actual possession of contraband is not necessary to 
sustain a conviction for a possessory crime, the facts and 
circumstances of a particular case must establish "constructive 
possession" in order to sustain a conviction. See State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316 (Utah 1985). In Fox, the Utah Supreme Court overturned 
convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute and production of a controlled substance when the State 
failed to show a sufficient nexus between the defendant, who had 
lived in a house in which officers found numerous marijuana plants, 
and the plants. The Court stated: 
To find the defendant had constructive possession of 
the drug or other contraband, it is necessary to 
prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the 
accused and the drug to permit an inference that the 
accused had both the power and the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the drug, 
[citations omitted] 
Id. at 319. In the present case, the officers knocked loudly 
several times before anyone answered the door. While the officers 
waited outside, an individual inside the premises could quickly have 
secreted the gun under the mattress. Mr. Martinez was not present 
at the time of the search, the probation officer had never seen him 
6
 The Probation Agreement lists the address of 8076 West; 
the Affidavit lists it as 8072 West, and Officer Stickley testified 
that it was 8070 West. 
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at the residence, and there is no showing, such as personal effects, 
that Mr. Martinez occupied the room in which the gun was located. 
The State failed to establish any nexus between Mr. Martinez and the 
gun, and the trial judge therefore abused his discretion in finding 
that the State proved the third allegation. 
B. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
THAT MR. MARTINEZ HAD COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 outlaws the possession with 
intent to use drug paraphernalia. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-3 defines 
drug paraphernalia and Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-4 outlines 
considerations in determining whether an object is drug 
paraphernalia. See Addendum C. 
As was the case with the firearm, the State failed to 
establish a sufficient nexus between Mr. Martinez and the 
paraphernalia. The officers found the scale on the kitchen counter; 
three persons other than Mr. Martinez were present in the area. 
(T 17, 8). Mr. Martinez was not present nor had the officers seen 
him in the apartment. (T 8, 10, 30). Although the officers found a 
receipt to Mr. Martinez for a scale, the State did not establish 
that the receipt was for the scale which was in fact found in the 
kitchen. Under the circumstances of this case, finding a scale in 
the kitchen was not sufficient to show that Mr. Martinez was in 
possession of that scale. 
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In order to violate Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5, an 
individual must not only possess an item of drug paraphernalia but 
must possess that item with an intent to use it in conjunction with 
illegal substances. Even if this Court believed the evidence was 
sufficient to link the scale to Mr. Martinez, the State nevertheless 
did not establish that he used or intended to use the scale in 
conjunction with illegal substances after being placed on probation. 
POINT II. THE OFFICERS ILLEGALLY SEIZED THE 
EVIDENCE FROM THE APARTMENT. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects probationers. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 438 U.S. 868 
(1987) . Although a warrant based on probable cause is not required 
to search the residence of a probationer, "reasonable grounds" to 
justify a warrantless search must exist or the officers must obtain 
a valid consent to search in order to comply with the fourth 
amendment. Id.; State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1260-1 (Utah 
1983) . 
A. THE SIGNED PROBATION AGREEMENT IS NOT A CONSENT 
TO SEARCH. 
Mr. Martinez objected to the introduction of any evidence 
seized from the apartment during the order to show cause hearing, 
arguing that the State had not established the legality of the 
search. (T 10). The State responded that the conditions of the 
probation agreement allowed the search. (T 10-11, 12-13). The 
trial court overruled the objection, concluding that the probation 
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agreement made the search lawful. (T 15-16). 
The probation agreement in the instant case contains two 
conditions which refer to the search of a residence. Condition 
number 8 states: 
I agree to allow an agent of the Department of 
Corrections to search my person, residence, vehicle 
or any other property under my control without a 
warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable 
suspicion as ascertained by an agent of the 
Department of Corrections to insure compliance with 
the conditions of probation. 
(emphasis added). 
Condition number 14 states "submit person, residence and 
vehicle to search for drugs." 
In State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1260 n.4, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that signing a parole agreement which contains a 
condition similar to the conditions set forth above "cannot in 
itself constitute a waiver of constitutional rights." Id. Pursuant 
to Velasquez, despite the existence of a parole agreement which 
contains such a provision, the parole officer must nevertheless have 
a reasonable suspicion that the parolee committed a parole violation 
or crime in order to conduct a warrantless search. 
At the very least, probationers are entitled to the same 
protections as parolees. Therefore, pursuant to Velasquez, the 
probation officer in the instant case needed a reasonable suspicion 
based on articulable facts in order to search the apartment. The 
agreement, standing alone, did not allow entry. 
In addition, the language of the agreement itself 
demonstrates that the probation agreement does not operate as a 
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consent to enter where the probationer is not present. In condition 
number 8, the probationer agreed to allow an agent to enter. On its 
face, this language requires a probationer to not resist a search if 
he is present but does not waive the fourth amendment right against 
illegal search and seizure. Condition number 14 is similar in that 
the probationer must "submit" his residence to a search. Again, the 
probationer must either actively consent to the search at the time 
the officers attempt to carry out the search, or, as the Court 
pointed out in State v. Velasquez, the language of the agreement 
allows the officers to enter based upon reasonable suspicion and 
dispenses with the usual requirement that a warrant based upon 
probable cause is required to search a residence. 
B. MR. MARTINEZ' BROTHER COULD NOT CONSENT TO A 
SEARCH OF THE APARTMENT. 
The burden is on the State to prove that a person giving 
consent to a search had the authority to do so. State v. Johnson, 
716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Idaho 1986); see also U.S. v. Matlock. 415 U.S. 
164 (1974) . In order to sustain this burden, the State is required 
to show that permission to search was obtained from a party who 
"possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to 
the premises or effects sought to be inspected." Id. 
The characteristics of common authority are mutual use 
and/or joint access or control, as would be the case with 
cohabitants. Johnson, 716 P.2d at 1294 n.7. In addition, the State 
must establish that the defendant assumed the risk "that one of 
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their number might permit the common area to be searched." Id., 
erupting U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).7 
The State failed to introduce any evidence that 
Mr. Martinez' brother had mutual use, joint access or joint control 
over the apartment. Indeed, the only evidence presented by the 
State as to who resided at the premises was the operations field 
report, which apparently stated that Appellant and his girlfriend 
were the only residents of the apartment. (T 6). The State also 
failed to introduce any evidence that Mr. Martinez had assumed the 
risk that his brother might consent to a search of his home. A 
valid consent to search did not occur in this case. 
C. THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PROBATION 
OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT MR. MARTINEZ 
HAD COMMITTED A CRIME OR VIOLATED A TERM OF 
PROBATION, THEREBY JUSTIFYING A WARRANTLESS SEARCH. 
In Velasquez, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the 
requirement that "a parole officer must have reasonable grounds for 
investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of his parole 
or committed a crime" in order to search. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 
1260. Any search must be "reasonably related to the officer's 
duty." The "middle ground" position adopted by the Court in 
Velasquez precludes parole officers from conducting full searches of 
parolees' homes whenever or as often as they choose. See Latta v. 
7
 Even if the State were able to establish both elements, 
the officer may still be able to search only common areas and not 
areas over which the defendant has exclusive control. State v. 
Johnson, 716 P.2d at 1294. 
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Fitzharris. 521 F.2d 246# 252 (1975). "Indeed it has been suggested 
that providing parole authorities with an unlimited power to conduct 
indiscriminate searches actually undermines the rehabilitation 
process." Id. 
Under Velasquez, "[a] search cannot be based upon a mere 
hunch without factual basis nor upon 'casual rumor, general 
reputation, or mere whim./M (Citation omitted.) Velasquez. 672 
P.2d at 1262. Instead, the officer must articulate specific facts 
or circumstances that gave rise to an articulable suspicion. In 
Velasquez, the officers relied on the tip from an informer, 
information from a person at the Salt Lake County Mental Health 
Center, and the observation that the parolees did not have a job. 
Velasquez. 672 P.2d at 1262. See also Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 
U.S. 868 (1987) (a tip by a reliable informant was sufficient 
evidence of violation to allow a search); State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 
1069 (Utah 1987) (evidence demonstrating probable cause to believe 
the defendant had committed a forgery met the reasonable suspicion 
standard). 
In the present case, the State produced no evidence 
demonstrating that the probation officer had a reasonable suspicion 
that Mr. Martinez had violated a condition of probation or committed 
a crime. The officer stated early in his testimony that earlier in 
the evening on January 1, 1990, he had received a phone call from a 
dispatcher at a halfway house requesting that he contact a deputy 
sheriff, and that the probation officer then spoke to the deputy 
sheriff. (T 6). The probation officer testified that he spoke to 
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the deputy "about an alleged assault by Mr. Martinez upon his coinmon 
law wife." At that point, defense counsel objected to the testimony 
and the trial court sustained the objection. (T 6). 
The prosecutor then asked: "You had a discussion, and as a 
result of that discussion and as a result of the contact by 
dispatch, did you, in fact, go to the apartment of Mr. Martinez?" 
(T 7). The probation officer responded: "Yes, I did." The 
probation officer gave no other information as to why he was at the 
apartment. Because an objection to the statement about the alleged 
assault was sustained, that statement should not be considered in 
determining whether the State established that the probation officer 
had a reasonable suspicion. However, even if it were considered, 
the statement is unclear and fails to set forth articulable facts to 
justify the search. Being directed to a residence by a deputy 
sheriff is not enough to sustain a search. The officer gave no 
background as to the facts of the alleged assault or whether 
Mr. Martinez had been charged with the crime as a result of that 
incident.8 Even if he had committed such a crime, searching the 
apartment in cupboards, under mattresses, etc. would not have aided 
in locating any evidence in regard to that crime. Nor would it have 
aided the officers in locating Mr. Martinez. 
The State also introduced evidence that on December 18, 
1989, when Mr. Martinez signed his probation agreement, the officer 
8
 The alleged assault was reflected in allegation number 1 
of the Affidavit in Support of the Order to Show Cause. The State 
presented no evidence in support of this allegation. 
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asked him whether or not he was still using controlled substances. 
According to the officer, at that time, Mr. Martinez claimed that he 
was smoking cocaine on a daily basis. (T 23) . Defense counsel 
objected to this testimony as irrelevant since it happened two weeks 
before the date of the search and before Mr. Martinez signed his 
probation agreement. (T 23). The trial judge overruled the 
objection and admitted the testimony. (T. 24). Because the 
statement occurred two weeks prior to the search, it did not give 
the officers a reasonable suspicion to search at the time the search 
was conducted. 
In this case, the prosecution simply failed to set forth 
articulable facts amounting to a reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Martinez had either committed a crime or violated a term of 
probation and, therefore, the search violated Mr. Martinez' fourth 
amendment rights and all of the evidence acquired in the search 
should have been excluded. In the absence of the evidence seized 
from the apartment, neither allegation number 3 nor allegation 
number 4 of the affidavit in support of the order to show cause can 
be established. 
POINT III. MR. MARTINEZ' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE 
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE RELIED ON CONDITIONS 
NUMBER 15 AND 6 IN REVOKING PROBATION. 
In articulating his decision, the trial judge stated that 
Mr. Martinez had violated condition number 6 and condition number 15 
of the probation agreement. (T 53). Despite defense counsel's 
objection that the State had not alleged a violation of condition 
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number 15, the court nevertheless apparently relied on that 
condition in violating probation, (T 54).9 See Addendum D for 
transcript of entire ruling. 
The purpose behind statutes which allow for probation is to 
"provide an opportunity for reformation." State v. Bonza, 150 P.2d 
970, 972 (Utah 1944). In keeping with this purpose, "[t]he decision 
of a trial court to modify or revoke probation is basically a 
discretionary matter . . . Nevertheless, in revoking probation, a 
court may not ignore fundamental precepts of fairness protected by 
the due process clause." Id. at 488. 
Among the due process rights possessed by a defendant in a 
probation revocation hearing are notice, the right to 
cross-examination, and the privilege of presenting evidence. 
Baine v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d at 557. 
In State v. Cowdell. the trial judge relied on a condition 
not in the affidavit to revoke probation. The affidavit in that 
case claimed that the defendant had committed an aggravated robbery; 
the trial judge, instead, relied on the defendant's driving under 
the influence in violating probation. The Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the trial court erred in relying on a condition not 
set forth in the affidavit because the defendant had not been given 
adequate notice of the claims against him. Id. At a minimum, the 
defendant is entitled to written notice. The Cowdell Court stated: 
9
 When the trial judge made his final findings, he did not 
rely on the violation of these two conditions. (T 55). They should 
not be relied on either in revoking probation or affirming the trial 
court's decision. 
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Lack of notice of a reason for which a person might 
be deprived of liberty completely denies that person 
the right to prepare a defense and effectively 
destroys the value of any defense that is available. 
Id. at 489. In Cowdell, the Court determined that the defendant had 
not received proper notice and that the error was prejudicial/ 
requiring reversal of the revocation order. 
In the present case, Mr. Martinez did not receive notice 
that the trial court would rely on any allegations other than those 
set forth in the affidavit. Furthermore, the evidence itself does 
not establish that Mr. Martinez "frequented places where drugs were 
used or sold," since he was not present when the officers appeared 
in the apartment. The trial judge erroneously relied on conditions 
not set forth in the affidavit in support of the order to show 
cause; such reliance should not support the probation violation in 
this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Charles Martinez, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the revocation order and remand this case to the 
trial court. 
SUBMITTED this £ day of August, 1990. 
L/NN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this fe? day of August, 1990. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by 
this day of August, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
PROBATION AGREEMENT fiQlQOnQfl 
COURT COUNTY/ CASE # 
I, Charles Marrinpz , agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of 
Corrections and to be accountable for my actions and conduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court 
I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the Court and set forth in this Agreement 
consistent with the laws of the State of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this Agreement and/or any conditions 
thereof or any new conviction for a crime may result in action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my 
probation period to commence again. 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
1. I shall report directly to my supervising agent in person by the 5th of each month or as otherwise directed. 
2. I shall permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere as required by the Department 
of Corrections for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of probation. 
3. I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at such residence in fact and on record and shall not 
change my place of residence without the knowledge of my probation agent 
4. I shall not leave the State of Utah without prior written authorization from the Department of Corrections. I agree 
and acknowledge that should I leave the State of Utah without prior written authonzation from the Department of 
Corrections, that I hereby waive extradition proceedings from any jurisdiction in which I may be found. 
5. I shall obey all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at ail times. I shall report any arrests or citations to 
the Department of Corrections within 72 hours of occurrence. 
6. I shall not own, possess, or have under my control or in my custody any explosives, firearms, or any dangerous 
weapons in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 921, et seq.; 18 U.S.C. App. § 1201, et seq. or Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501, as amended. 
7. I shall abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of 
marijuana, narcotics, controlled substances or other drugs as defined in the Controlled Substance Act Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-2, as amended. I agree to submit to urinalysis or other tests for marijuana, narcotics, controlled substances or other 
drugs upon reasonable suspicion as ascertained by and at the request of a probation agent of the Department of 
Corrections to ensure compliance with this condition of probation. 
8. I agree to allow an agent of the Department of Corrections to search my person, residence, vehicle or any other 
property under my control, without a warrant any time day or night upon reasonable suspicion as ascertained by an agent 
of the Department of Corrections to ensure compliance with the conditions of probation. 
9. I shall not associate with any known criminal in any manner which can reasonably be expected to result in, or 
which has resulted in criminal or illegal activity. 
10. I shall seek, obtain and maintain verifiable, lawful employment and/or education. 
11. I shall comply with the following special condit i^s as ordered by the Court 
19- Pay a f-fr>* o f $7500.00 at a rat* nf 3100.00 ppr ntnnfh. n . O h f a i n * d m g anH a l r n h n l w -
aluation and complete any program they reccomend. 14.Submit person,residence and vehicle 
to searcft ror arugs. O.Do not trequent places wtiere drugs are used or soia.it>.use or poss-
P O O r t n a l ^ V i r J 17 Vin n n f H O Q n o n - p o r c r n W ^ n f r n l l ^ c u K c f - a n ^ o o 1 flNn restart t J i f h nth(*r 
f e l o n s . 19. Complte 120 days of community s erv i ce .20 . Pay $150.00 substance abuse f ee . 
I have read, understand and agree to the above conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this 
Agreement 
Dated this. . day of 
uca 
^A^J^^Zi/^ 
Address: 
Go?A rw?vr^ r.-^W 
ADDENDUM B 
' f t . <>* - * 
I <\ ~* 
JpN^J 
Lfbfc»lity C l OfK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
VS 
MARTINEZ, Charles 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Court Case No: 891901398 
Judge: Raymond S. Uno 
Def. Atty. ' : Kirk Bennett 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) : ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
J e f f r e y T. S t i c k l e y , b e i n g duly sworn upon an oath 
deposes and says t h a t : He i s a Probation O f f i c e r for the Utah S t a t e 
Department of C o r r e c t i o n s ; t h a t on the 23rd day of October, 1989, the 
above-named defendant was adjudged g u i l t y of the crime of Unlawful 
P o s s e s s i o n of a C o n t r o l l e d Substance in the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d Court and on 
t h e 20th day of November, 1989, was sentenced to s e r v e a term of 0-5 y e a r s 
in the Utah S t a t e P r i s o n ; tha t the e x e c u t i o n of the imposed sentence was 
s t a y e d and the defendant was p laced on probat ion under the s u p e r v i s i o n of 
the Department of C o r r e c t i o n s ; t h a t the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d defendant did 
v i o l a t e the terms and c o n d i t i o n s of the d e f e n d a n t ' s probat ion as f o l l o w s , 
t o - w i t : 
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1. By having committed the offense of Spouse Abuse, a class A Misdemeanor 
on or about January 1, 1990, at about 8072 W. 3500 South, #23, Magna, 
UT, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in violation of condition number 
5 of the probation agreement, 
2. By having committed the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance 
a Third Degree Felony, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
in violation of condition numbers 5 and 7 of the probation agreement. 
3. By having had in his possession a Firearm, on or about January 2, 1990, 
at about 8072 W. 3500 South, #23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, in violation of condition number 5 of the probation 
agreement. 
4. By having committed the offense of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a 
class B Misdemeanor, on or about January 2, 1990, at about 8072 West, 
3500 South, #23, in Magna, Utah, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 
violation of condition number 5 of the probation agreement. 
WHEREFORE, vour affiant prays that an Order of the Court issue 
directing and requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before 
said Court to show cause, if any, has, why the aforesaid period of 
probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not be 
forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
.'Sticfcley, PRPBTATION OFFICER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Cy 
19j&_. 
rcL 
dav of J^KUar 
RV PUBLIC 
£ 
A Y1 
Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Commission expires: \'&-)—)*fl0 
o 
ADDENDUM C 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when 
the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice-President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the 
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any 
of the male inhabitants of such State, being 
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the 
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or elector of President 
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or 
military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United 
States, or as a member of any State legislature or 
as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall 
have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against 
the same or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds 
pf each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United 
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred 
for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, 
obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and 
void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this 
article. 
58-37a-3. "Drug paraphernalia" defined. 
As used in this chapter: 
"Drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or material used, 
or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manu-
facture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack-
age, repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to other-
wise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of 
Chapter 37, Title 58, and includes, but is not limited to: 
(1) Kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, culti-
vating, growing, or harvesting any species of plant which is a con-
trolled substance or from which a controlled substance can be de-
rived; 
(2) Kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, 
converting, producing, processing, or preparing a controlled sub-
stance; 
(3) Isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the 
potency of any species of plant which is a controlled substance; 
(4) Testing equipment used, or intended for use, to identify or to 
analyze the strength, effectiveness, or purity of a controlled sub-
stance; 
(5) Scales and balances used, or intended for use, in weighing or 
measuring a controlled substance; 
(6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, man-
nitol, mannited, dextrose and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut 
a controlled substance; 
(7) Separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove 
twigs, seeds, or other impurities from marihuana; 
(8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or 
intended for use to compound a controlled substance; 
(9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or 
intended for use to package small quantities of a controlled sub-
stance; 
(10) Containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store 
or conceal a controlled substance; 
(11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or in-
tended for use to parenterally inject a controlled substance into the 
human body; and 
(12) Objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or other-
wise introduce marihuana, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the 
human body, including but not limited to: 
(a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic 
pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, 
or punctured metal bowls; 
(b) Water pipes; 
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices; 
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning mate-
rial, such as a marihuana cigarette, that has become too small or 
too short to be held in the hand; 
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials; 
(g) Chamber pipes; 
(h) Carburetor pipes; 
(i) Electric pipes; 
(j) Air-driven pipes; 
(k) Chillums; 
0) Bongs; and 
(m) Ice pipes or chillers. 
58-37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object is 
drug paraphernalia* 
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in 
addition to all other logically relevant factors, should consider: 
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object con-
cerning its use; 
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the 
object, under any state or federal law relating to a controlled substance; 
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of 
this chapter; 
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance; 
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object; 
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object con 
cerning its use; 
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain of de-
pict its use; 
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use; 
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale; 
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate 
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed 
distributor or dealer of tobacco products; 
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object 
to the total sales of the business enterprise; 
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the 
community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use. 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a con-
trolled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person 
who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise intro-
duce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
PART 5 
WEAPONS 
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions. 
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally 
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws 
throughout the state. 
(b) The provisions of this part are uniformly applicable throughout this 
state and in all its political subdivisions and municipalities. No local 
authority may enact or enforce any rule in conflict with the provisions of 
this part. 
(2) For the purpose of this part: 
(a) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use 
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In 
construing whether an item, object, or thing not commonly known as a 
dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon, the character of the instru-
ment, object, or thing; the character of the wound produced, if any; and 
the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used are deter-
minative. 
(b) "Firearms" means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off shotguns, or sawed-
off rifles, or any device that could be used as a weapon from which is 
expelled a projectile by any force. 
(c) "Sawed-ofF shotgun" means a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of 
fewer than 18 inches in length, or in the case of a rifle, having a barrel or 
barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any weapon made from a rifle 
or shotgun by alteration, modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as 
modified has an overall length of fewer than 26 inches. 
(d) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is unlawful to discharge 
a weapon. 
(e) "Crime of violence" means murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, 
mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extortion, or 
blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year, arson pimishable by imprisonment for 
more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses. 
(f) "Bureau" means the Utah State Bureau of Criminal Identification. 
76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded. 
For the purpose of this section, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or other 
weapon described in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when there is an 
unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the firing position, except in the 
case of pistols and revolvers, in which case they shall be deemed loaded when 
the unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a position that the manual 
operation of any mechanism once would cause the unexpended cartridge, 
shell, or projectile to be fired; and a muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed tc 
be loaded when it is capped or primed and has a powder charge and ball or 
shot in the barrel or cylinders. 
76-10-503. Possession of dangerous weapon — Persons 
not permitted to have — Provisions for aliens — 
Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who is not either a citizen of the United States or a 
lawfully admitted alien whose business, occupation, or duties require the 
use of a dangerous weapon; or a lawfully admitted alien who has obtained 
a special hunting permit from the Department of Public Safety; or any 
person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under the laws of 
the United States, the state, or any other state, government, or country, 
or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or any person who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
this part. The Department of Public Safety shall adopt rules governing 
the issuance and use of special hunting permits for lawfully admitted 
aliens. 
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun, 
he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole for a felony or is incarcerated at the 
Utah state prison or other like facility may not have in his possession or 
under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in this 
part. 
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third degree 
felony, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive or infernal 
machine, he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon. 
(1) Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503 and 
those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dan-
gerous weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
except that a firearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a case, 
gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon, 
but: 
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains no ammunition, 
he shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he 
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor; or 
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off shotgun, or if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall be 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons de-
scribed in Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of residence, place 
of business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall 
be a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle. 
76-10-505. Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle or on street. 
Every person who carries a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on any public 
street in an incorporated city or in a prohibited area of an unincorporated 
territory within this state is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
76-10-506. Threatening with or using dangerous weapon 
in fight or quarrel. 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, not 
in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or 
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or un-
lawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. 
76-10-507. Possession of deadly weapon with intent to as-
sault. 
Every person having upon his person any dangerous weapon with intent to 
unlawfully assault another is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from vehicle or near high-
way. 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge any kind of firearm from an 
automobile or other vehicle or to discharge a firearm from, upon, or across any 
highway. A person violating any provision of this section is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
76-10-509. Possession of dangerous weapon by minor. 
A minor under the age of eighteen may not possess a dangerous weapon as 
defined herein unless he has the permission of his parent or guardian to have 
such weapon or is accompanied by parent or guardian while he has such 
weapon in his possession. In any event, any minor who is under the age of 
fourteen years must be accompanied by a responsible adult. 
76-10-510. Possession of weapon authorized — Permit or 
license not required. 
Nothing in this part shall be construed to prohibit a citizen of the United 
States over the age of eighteen years who resides or is temporarily within this 
state and who is not within the excepted classes as prescribed by Section 
76-10-503 from owning, possessing, or keeping within his place of residence or 
place of business or any vehicle under his control any pistol, revolver, or other 
firearm or dangerous weapon capable of being concealed upon the person, and 
no permit or license to purchase, own, possess, or to keep any such firearm or 
weapon at his place of residence, or place of business, or any vehicle under his 
control, shall be required of him. 
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(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate. 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the court, 
for the collection of fines and restitution during the probation period in cases 
for which the court orders supervised probation by the department. The prose-
cutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The 
clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the 
order to the parties. The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(7) (a) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon expiration or termi-
nation of the probation period, has outstanding fines or restitution owing, 
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant 
on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the 
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines and restitution. Upon 
motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own motion, the court may 
require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be 
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended jail or prison term 
should not be imposed. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court 
and prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termi-
nation of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall 
include a probation progress report and complete report of details on 
outstanding fines and restitution orders. 
(8) (a) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after hav-
ing been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to 
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total pro-
bation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke 
the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or 
decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of 
time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. * 
(9) (a) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that 
the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may 
not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts as-
serted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation i! 
justified. If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hear-
ing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The 
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him ii 
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right. *« 
present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The per-
sons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defen-
dant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may 
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
(e) After the hearing the coiirt shall make findings of fact. Upon a 
finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court 
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful 
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985. 
ADDENDUM D 
found it. 
MR. ELLETT: It doesn't matter. 
MR. BROWN: It sure does. 
THE COURT: Based on what the court has heard, the 
court is of the opinion that the defendant has violated his 
conditions of probation. I was going over the field 
operations written report. And, his signature is on there 
stating that his address is 8070 or six West 3500 South, 
apartment number 23, and there is only one apartment 23 in 
that complexn. Names of people living at the same address is 
only one person, Debbie Hardman. List other people or 
addresses you stay at. He has none. So, that means that his 
place of residence is that place there. 
Based on that, the court, drawing inferences in 
regards to that being his place of residence under his 
probation agreement, number six it says, I shall not own, 
possess or have under my control or custody explosives or 
firearms or any dangerous weapons. 
The weapon was found under the mattress and in the 
place where he has indicated he resides with no other person 
other than this Debbie Hardman. In addition, one of the 
conditions that the court released him on, was that he not 
frequent any place where drugs are sold, used or otherwise 
distributed illegally and these drugs were found in his 
premises. So, whether they were sold or used or distributed, 
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1 I don't know, but, apparently, there is some residue and the 
2 paraphernalia is there. That would be under number 15 also, 
3 his probation agreement, do not frequent places where drugs 
4 are used, sold. 
5 MR. BROWN: Your Honor, that's not one of the 
6 subjects of the order to show cause. 
7 THE COURT: But, one of the things is, there is a 
8 violation of his probation agreement here. 
9 MR. BROWN: But, as I understand it, the violations 
10 are written up in an order to show cause, and they are alleged 
11 one, two, three, and four, and they have to be specified for 
12 what the violations are. I don't think the court can go 
13 through the violation agreement at this time and pick out 
14 things that he may have been in violation of and use that 
15 against him even though it hasn't been alleged in the order to 
16 show cause. 
17 MR. ELLETT: I dispute that, Your Honor. I think 
18 this court has a right once it's been brought to the court's 
19 attention to look at any evidence that indicates a violation 
20 of probation. 
21 THE COURT: At least two of the items there are 
22 drug paraphernalia, and he's not supposed to be where it's 
23 used or sold or possessed. And, the other one is the weapons. 
24 So, at least two of them items that were brought as charges 
25 against him, I think, have been shown as far as preponderance 
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of the evidence is concerned. 
MR. BROWN: So, what specifically is the court's 
finding with regard to the four allegations? Obviously, 
number one, there is no evidence with respect to that. 
THE COURT: Number one, since this is the 
evidentiary hearing for this order to show cause, that will be 
found not to be, he denied the allegation. The court supports 
his denial and does not find there was any violation. 
MR. BROWN: His allegation dismissed. 
THE COURT: That allegation is dismissed. And 
number two, there was residue there, but aside from the 
residue, there does not seem to be any other evidence that 
there was controlled substances that he had, so number two 
will be dismissed. But, number three, the court finds he's in 
violation of, and number four the court finds he's in 
violation of. 
MR. STICKLEY: Your Honor, would you like a 
recommendation from our agency? 
THE COURT: I guess we ought to have something 
before the court pronounces what it's going to do. 
MR. STICKLEY: Looking back over Mr. Martinez's 
long criminal history, he has been on probation previously on 
two occasions, and he did violate numerous times and was tried 
with new criminal charges. We have information from 
informants. 
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